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DISCUSSION:  ECONOMIC  AND  POLITICAL  FACTORS  INFLUENCING
THE  OUTCOME  OF  THE  1981  FARM  BILL
Ronald  D.  Knutson
The papers by Boehm and Spitze provide con-  not only provide increased  supply assurance, but
trasts in approach, content, and conclusions.  The  also raise the price ceilings,  the latitude for price
Spitze  paper  reflects  the  issues  as  seen through  instability  would  also  increase.  In  addition,  re-
the  eyes  of an  observant  professor  located  in  a  search  suggests that within the  current  relation-
major Corn Belt university. Its ideas reflect  sen-  ship  of support,  release,  and call prices,  market
sitivity  to  articulation  of  policy  problems  con-  prices  tend  to  center on or  be attracted  toward
fronting producers  in the region.  Boehm's  paper  the loan rate, the release price,  or the call price,
is  particularly  strong  in that  it reflects  the  day-  depending  on  the  grain  supply-demand  balance
to-day  sensitivity to the contemporary  economic  (Gardner and Just).  That  is, with large  stocks in
and  political forces  that currently affect  the pol-  the  reserve,  the market price rests near the loan
icy  process.  Both papers lack a clear sensitivity  rate.  As stocks decrease,  at some point the mar-
to  the policy  position  and  problems  of southern  ket  price  is  attracted  off  the  loan  and  moves
agriculture,  rapidly to near the release level. With a sufficient
This discussion is divided into two parts, major  drawdown  of stocks, price moves off the release
points  of needed  refinement,  and  a perspective  to near the call level.
on the  issues  as  they relate  to  southern  agricul-  If the differential between the loan rate and the
ture.  release price were widened,  one could anticipate
that a large quantity of grain in the reserve would
result  in  market  prices  that would  approximate
POINTS  OF  REFINEMENT  the  loan level.  That  is,  the  wider  the difference
between the  loan rate  and the  release  price,  the
Four major points  of refinement  exist with re-  more resistance  one  would expect  to the market
spect to the  two papers.  price moving off the loan level. There has not yet
been enough experience  with the farmer-held re-
Uncertainty  serve to demonstrate the validity of this hypothe-
sis.
Both  papers  contain  considerable  discussion  Despite  extensive  discussion  of the  uncer-
of the impact that increased  uncertainty  has  had  tainty  issue,  neither paper recognizes  the role of
upon  agriculture.  The  major  policy  tool for re-  government  in  contributing  to  uncertainty
ducing  price  and  supply  uncertainty  is  the  (Schultz).  Government  decisions  to  impose  em-
farmer-held  reserve  program.  bargoes  and price controls  have had  a major de-
Boehm  spends  considerable  time  discussing  stabilizing  effect upon  agricultural  prices.  Many
the virtues  of this program.  While the usefulness  other  program  detail  decisions,  such  as  not  re-
of  the  reserve  as  a  policy  tool  has  been  amply  leasing  grain from the reserve  when required  by
demonstrated,  some problems  are apparent.  published  rules  or  reversing  a  marketing  order
Substantial  conflicts  exist  between  the  three  policy,  have  substantial destabilizing  effects.
major reserve objectives of price stability, supply  Spitze  suggests that one alternative  to such ac-
availability,  and price  support. Although produc-  tions might be to place limits in the 1981  farm bill
ers  have  been  attracted  into  the  reserve  by the  on  embargoes  and the  size  of the  grain reserve.
combination  of relatively  low  market  prices,  Reality  suggests  that,  regardless  of  the  limits
interest and storage subsidies, they are becoming  placed on policy-makers, decisions  to change the
increasingly  disenchanted  with the price  ceilings  manner  in which policy  is  implemented  are fre-
set  by  the  reserve  release  and  call  prices-  the  quently  dictated  either by  domestic  or  interna-
reserve  could  be  "sold  out,"  thus jeopardizing  tional political conditions.  Laws never appear to
both  its price  stability and  supply  assurance  ob-  be sufficiently tight to prevent government  from
jectives.  This is particularly true of the feedgrain  taking  action  under such  conditions.  For exam-
reserves  for  which  the  release  price  is  125  per-  pie,  strong  incentives  exist  to  accumulate  re-
cent  of  the  loan  rate,  and  the  call price  is  140  serves  when surpluses exist. If surpluses are  suf-
percent of the loan  rate.  ficiently  great,  political forces  would  likely sug-
While raising the release  and call prices would  gest raising any reserve limit. Likewise, laws that
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25prohibit  embargoes  except  where  "national  se-  Senator Dole has indicated  that Block might find
curity" considerations  are involved can  be inter-  some  support to  do away  with target prices,  de-
preted sufficiently broadly to fit almost any situa-  pending on what he  does  with loan  rates.
tion (certainly  the  1980  Russian  embargo  would  On  the  Hill,  increased  influence  of  Senators
have been interpreted to involve  a national  secu-  Helms  and Dole can be expected to complement
rity  issue because  expansion of Russia's  sphere  Block's  more  producer-oriented  philosophy.
of influence  in  the world  was involved).  This alignment,  when  combined with  leadership
Over  time,  I  am  increasingly  coming  to  sub-  changes  in the  House,  could  shift the balance of
scribe to a theory picked up from Don Paarlberg.  influence in food and agricultural policy formula-
It  suggests  that  if  a  policy  tool  is  available  for  tion to the Senate.
government to use, the clear incentive is for it to  It  would  be  dangerous  to  take  the  producer-
be used whether needed or not.  To illustrate,  the  oriented  philosophy  espoused  by  Secretary
Packers  and  Stockyards  Administration  con-  Block too seriously  in a policy decision  context.
tinued to regulate rates for stockyard services  far  During the past decade,  several of the significant
beyond  the  date required  by  changing  competi-  agricultural policy decisions  have not been made
tive conditions. Set-asides were used in the 1970s  by the secretary of agriculture.  Examples  include
without clear justification,  and certainly  without  the signing of the long-term trade agreement with
effectiveness  in  controlling  production  and  rais-  the  Soviet  Union,  the  imposition of export  em-
ing  prices.  bargos,  and  the  decision  to  freeze  food  prices.
An  extension  of  this  theory  of  government  Many  less  significant  agriculture  secretary  rec-
involvement  might  suggest  that  as  agriculture  ommendations  have  been  reversed  upon  reach-
moves into  a new  era of both  a tighter food  and  ing  the  executive  office  of the president  for ap-
fiber supply-demand balance and a shifting of the  proval.  At  the  same  time,  the  secretary  has  on
balance  of political  power  away  from  farmers,  occasions  in the past decade  had a major impact
policies  and programs  enacted to protect farmers  on policy direction.  Effective implementation  of
might be used  against them.  For example,  in the  a  trade-oriented  philosophy  by  Secretary  Butz
early  1970s,  Secretary  Butz  restricted  the  rice  and  the  establishment  of the  farmer-held  grain
allotment in  a manner  that eventually  resulted  in  reserve  by  the  Bergland-Hjort  team  are  exam-
rice  producers  being forced  to  give  up  the pro-  ples.
gram.  A  similar  strategy  is  currently  being  em-  The point is that the effectiveness  of the secre-
ployed with respect to the peanut program.  Both  tary of agriculture in implementing programs that
the  federal  milk  order  and  milk  price  support  farmers view as being in their interest is to a large
programs  have  the  potential  for  being  used  extent  determined by power relationships  within
against  dairy farmers  in the  1980s.  the cabinet and the executive  office of the presi-
dent.  Secretary Block set the stage for the lifting
New Leadership  of the grain embargo  as being an early test of this
power relationship.
The  change  in leadership  within USDA and in  Crisis Theory
the Congress has significant implications for both
the  1981  farm bill and related  policy  decisions.  Boehm's  crisis  theory  is  not only  interesting,
It  should  not necessarily  be assumed  that the  but  also  useful  to  keep  in  mind  for  policy  re-
new  Republican  policy  team  signals  a complete  searchers  and  educators.  However,  question
return  to  a  Butz-era  farm  policy  philosophy.  may  be  raised  about  whether  there  really  is  a
Both Boehm and Spitze  correctly  sense the diffi-  long-term trend toward  crisis policies  in agricul-
culty  of  predicting  the  future  of  Reagan-Block  ture.
farm policy initiatives. Secretary Butz, like OMB  There  have  been  periods  in which  economic
Director  Stockman,  was  driven  by  the ideologi-  conditions  in  agriculture  have  been  sufficiently
cal philosophy  of allowing domestic and interna-  unstable  that  farm  policy  was  continuously  on
tional  market  forces  to  operate.  His  implicit,  if  the agenda of the Congress.  Such periods  might
not  explicit,  goal  of  dismantling  ASCS  reflects  include  the settlement  and technology  decade  of
this  philosophy.  It  contrasts  with  Secretary  the  1860s,  the  depression  decade  of  the  1930s,
Block's defense of the tobacco, peanut, and price  and the post-war attempts  to get control of farm
support  program.  Block  has  expressed  prices  and overproduction  (Benedict).
philosophical  opposition  to  target  prices.  This  An  interesting  related  point  is  Boehm's  con-
opposition  appears  to  stem  primarily  from  the  clusion  that  despite  the  legislative  turmoil  that
dislike of the welfare  image associated with defi-  has existed  in the late  1970s,  farmers as  a whole
ciency  payments  held by many  farmers.  were really not that bad off. This could reflect the
Target prices were  supported by Butz with the  increased  structural  segmentation  that  exists
political  realization  that  without  target  prices;  within  agriculture  (USDA).  Macroagricultural
pressure  would exist to  raise support prices to a  income  levels  and averages  are increasingly less
level  where  our competitive  position  in the  ex-  useful  in evaluating  the  degree  of unrest  within
port market would  be jeopardized.  Interestingly,  agriculture.  Such numbers are heavily influenced
26by  the  relative  overall  prosperity  both  of the  cial,  and  political  organization  of  southern  ag-
large farms  and the part-time  farms.  riculture  must be considered  also.
A special interest group of unrest  is developing
within  agriculture.  This interest  group  could  be  Economic  Differences
characterized  as the  middle-size  younger farmer
who rents most of his land and has a severe  cash  Over  time,  northern  and  southern  agriculture
flow problem competing  at current prices.  These  have  become  increasingly  interdependent.  This
farmers find themselves in competition with large  has occurred as the production of corn, sorghum,
owner-operators,  who have lower nominal costs,  soybeans,  wheat,  and  milk  has  increased  in  the
as  well  as  with  part-time  operators,  who  have  South.  Thus, while significant southern policy is-
less  concern  for relative  costs  because  they are  sues  relating  to  tobacco,  peanuts,  sugar,  rice,
not  primarily  dependent  on their farm  operation  and cotton  still exist,  southern  farmers  have be-
for their income.  come  increasingly  interested  in  policy  decisions
relating  to  feedgrains,  soybeans,  wheat,  and
Research and Education  milk.
While Midwest farmers traditionally have been
Spitze rightfully raises the research and educa-  skeptical  of  southern  control  of the  agriculture
tion organization  and funding  issue  to  a level  of  committees,  southern  farmers  have  become  in-
visibility.  Agricultural  economists  have  been  creasingly  concerned  that feedgrain,  wheat,  soy-
guilty  of not  recognizing  earlier the  significance  bean,  and dairy  policy  has  a "Corn  Belt bias."
of Title  XIV of the Food and Agricultural Act  of  Such  a  bias exists  not only because  the  bulk of
1977.  This  act set up an ill-conceived and poorly  these products  has traditionally been produced in
implemented  system  of federal  planning  for ag-  the  North,  but  also  because  agriculture  secre-
ricultural research,  teaching, and extension,  now  taries,  and  the  top  USDA  appointees  typically
known as  the Joint Council  (Castle).  have  come from  the North.  In other words,  the
The ability of this legislation  to get through the  South has had,  and continues to have,  an agricul-
Congress  virtually  without  notice  vividly  illus-  tural  policy  influence  and  leadership  problem
trates (1) The lack of political organization,  mus-  primarily  with  respect  to  northern  crops.  This
cle,  and  awareness  of the  food  and  agricultural  conflict can  be  expected  to continue.
research  system.  (2)  The  willingness  of the  sys-  Southern  agriculture  is  also  characterized  by
tem to horse trade the potential for more federal  significant  structural  differences.  Production  in
support  dollars for a system of federal  planning.  the  South tends to be more  highly concentrated.
(3)  The  lack  of willingness  and/or  ability  to  Land  holdings,  cattle  feeding,  and  dairy  enter-
mobilize  the agricultural establishment  and  chal-  prises  tend  to  have  a larger  proportion  of  the
lenge Washington power brokers who do not un-  production concentrated  on the largest farms. At
derstand  or appreciate  the  virtues  of the  decen-  the same time, a greater dichotomy of size exists
tralized food and agricultural  research system of  in southern agriculture between the large and the
which  we  are  a  part  (Knutson,  Paarlberg,  and  small farm.  That  is,  while  a larger proportion  of
McCalla).  the  production  is  concentrated  on  very  large
Without  a  politically  potent  organization,  southern farms,  there  is  also  a larger number  of
USDA  research  and  extension  functions  run  a  small farms (USDA,  p.  75).
great  risk  of  taking  a disproportionate  share  of  The  result  of this  dichotomy  is  a greater  con-
any  budget-cutting  effort.  This  is  likely  when  centration of farm program benefits in the  hands
there  is  a lack of land-grant-oriented  individuals  of  the  largest  farmers  in  the  South  (USDA,
at top levels  within USDA.  p.  103).  Policies  to  effectively  allocate  a  larger
proportion  of farm  program  benefits  to  smaller
producers  would  have  greater  impact  upon  the
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  SOUTHERN  South.
AGRICULTURE  Resource  problems  are  of greater importance
in the South.  Weather extremes in terms of rain-
Southern  agriculture  has  many  of the  same  fall/and heat  are greater during  the growing  sea-
problems  as  northern  agriculture:  both  are  con-  son.  Continuation  of the  disaster program  is  of
fronted by problems of price and income instabil-  greater  interest  to  the  South  than  it  is  to  the
ity, unprecedented  inflation, and a disadvantaged  North.
producer market position.  The availability  of water for irrigation  has  be-
The  differences  between  southern  and  north-  come a major issue in several areas of the South.
ern  agriculture  have  both  an  economic  and  a  Serious  question exists  with  regard to the public
philosophical-sociological-political  basis  (Knut-  willingness  to invest money  in irrigation  projects
son).  The  importance  of these  differences  in  in-  designed  to  sustain  agricultural  production  in
terpreting  policy  implications  cannot  be  over-  several areas  of the  South and  West.  A Reagan
looked:  that  is, what counts  is not just the crops  administration  should  be  more  sensitive  to  this
or  livestock  that  are  grown.  The  economic,  so-  need than the Carter  administration.
27While  substantial  southern  land  areas  still are  Stated  more  crudely,  the  political  bosses  are
being  developed  for agricultural  production,  the  stronger in southern  agriculture.
migration  of people  to  the  Sun  Belt  is  creating  With this  background,  I am not as pessimistic
increased  competition  for  both  water  and  land  about the future of the southern commodity pro-
resources.  Substantial  competition  will continue  grams in the  1981  farm bill as Boehm.  The South
to develop between use of southern lands for ag-  is in control of both agriculture  committees.  Sec-
ricultural  and forestry purposes.  retary  Block is already  in a position of defending
It  is  obvious that resource  policy  is  more  im-  these programs-at least partially to gain support
portant  to the South than  it is  to the North.  of the committee leadership.  In the end, political
pragmatism  could even concede and recommend
that  the  president  sign  a  farm  bill  that  retains
Philosophical-Sociological  and Political  peanut allotments,  the tobacco  program,  and  75
Differences  percent of parity  dairy price  supports.
Yet  I  agree  that  these  programs  will  need  to
Political power  is more  highly concentrated  in  adjust  as  economic  forces  affecting  agriculture
the  South than  in  the North.  Large-scale  south-  adjust.  For example,  I  have  argued  that peanut
ern farmers traditionally  have  been in  a position  producers  might  be better  off  striking  a  deal  in
of  power  both  within  their  farm  organizations  the  1981 farm bill for a relatively high target price
and  political parties.  The  traditional  power bro-  and pursue development  of the export market as
ker role  of these  producers,  combined  with the  rice  farmers  have  done.  Unfortunately,  there
higher  risk  of  southern  agriculture,  have  given  may not be a target price program to compromise
southern  crop-producing  leadership  a  more  lib-  over. Likewise,  as  Spitze implies,  the sugarcane
eral outlook on the role of government in agricul-  producers  have  to  recognize  that  competition
ture.  However,  this liberalism does not extend to  from corn  sweeteners  substantially  changes  the
support for the food-stamp-related  income  redis-  economics of import controls as  a means of rais-
tribution programs.  ing their returns while retaining  their market.
Nevertheless,  a clear distinction  must be made  Such  changes  are  in and  of themselves  bitter
between  the  crop  producer  and  the  livestock  pills  for  the  southern  crop  farmer  to  swallow.
producer.  Southern  cattlemen  are  notoriously  The  reality that he  is increasingly unable  to con-
anti-government-except  when  it  comes  to  is-  trol his economic destiny through political means
sues  such as beef imports.  Yet southern political  is becoming  apparent in a larger number of situa-
leaders  of  both  crop  and  livestock  producers  tions.  Some day even the tobacco farmer may be
enjoy  a substantial following  of their producers.  forced to  recognize this  reality.
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